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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
JESSE J. LEAVITT and PHOEBE 
LEAVITT, his wife 
Plaintiff-Appellants, 
vs. 
ELEANOR BLOHM, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
vs. 
VERDA LYNN, 
Third Party Defendant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
9153 
On December 22, 1955, Forrest and Renae Hancock, fee 
simple title holders of the property in dispute, sold the 
same to Deloy E. Smith et ux by Uniform Real Estate Con-
tract. The sales price was $7 5,000.00. The down payment 
was $17,080.00, the balance was to be paid at the rate 
of $300.00 per month including interest at 5% per annum 
and these payments were due on the 15th day of each 
month. The contract provided for a 45 day grace period. 
(Exhibit 1). 
In August of 1956 the vendee's interest in this con-
tract was assigned to I. J. Kartchner, (ignoring the assign-
l 
LyDIL 
1r.:·! 
rrac::: 
I I tOO.OO; 
!nd of l 
~p:o 
£-::=.: 
1 tractstt 
]ljcr:y 
~i:~.~: 
:fj of 0 
b~"l; 
to~e:: :. 
rateai: 
I No.~) 
1ne:~~ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
ment to A. M. J. Inc., Kartchner's alter ego). (Exhibits 
2, 3, and 4.) 
On August 1, 1956, I. J. Kartchner, vendor, and Verda 
Lynn, vendee, (ignoring the sale to Lynn Realty, Inc., 
Lynn's alter ego) entered into a Uniform Real Estate Con-
tract for the sale of the subject property: sales price $86,-
000.00; payments of $555.00 during 6 months of the year 
and of $375.00 during the other 6 months; $4,000.00 down; 
interest at 5%. This contract provided for a 30 day grace 
period. (Exhibits 6 and 8). On or about the last day of 
Nove·mber, 1956J Lynn paid the September and October pay-
ments due Hancock ($600.00) to Miller and Viele, Hancocks 
duly appointed collection agent. All payments prior to 
September were timely made. Lynn made all payments due 
Kartchner under the August 10, Uniform Real Estate Con-
tract strictly when due, to and including the payment due 
January 10, 1957. 
On November 10, 1957, Verda Lynn, vendor, and Eleanor 
Blohm, vendee, entered into a Uniform Real Estate Con-
tract for the sale of the property in dispute: sales price 
$95,705.00; alleged down payment of $5,000.00 by the trans-
fer of other property; monthly payments of $450.00 each 
November through May, and $630.00 each June through Oc-
tober; 1st payment due November 1, 1957; interest at the 
rate of 5% per annum; and 30 days grace period. (Exhibit 
No.6.) On January 10, 1957, Blohm paid Kartchner $380.00. 
(Defendants Answer and Counterclaim). On January 10, 
1957, Lynn assigned all of her right, title and interest in 
and to the Kartchner-Lynn contract and the Lynn-Blohm 
contract to the plaintiffs. (Exhibits 6, 7, and 8). On 
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Nov~mber I, 1956, the Hancocks had demanded payment 
of past due installments from Kartchner and Lynn. (Ex-
hibit 11). 
On March 25, 1957, Leavitt paid $1,500.00 to Kartchner, 
and two or three days thereafter the tender was refused 
by Hancocks, Kartchner having forwarded the $1,500.00 
bank money order of Leavitts' thereto. (Exhibits 11, 13, and 
25.) 
On March 26, 1957, Kartchner, vendor, and Leavitts, 
vendees, entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract dated 
August 10, 1956, designed to replace the August 10, 1956, 
Kartchner-Lynn contract at this time owned by the Leavitts. 
Kartchner also gave Leavitt an option to purchase the 
Kartchner equity in the property for 50% of its face value. 
(Exhibit No. 5.) 
On April 25, 1957, the Hancocks filed their Amended 
Complaint in Civil No. 2148 seeking termination of the 
Hancock-Smith contract, possession of the property, for-
feiture of all sums paid, damages in the sum of $900.00 per 
month, and attorney's fees of $1,500.00. Summons had been 
served on Eleanor Blohm March 25, 1957, upon the Leavitts 
and the Kartchners April 1, and upon Verda Lynn April 9. 
No complaints were filed with the clerk of the Court. Lynn, 
the Kartchners and the Leavitts filed general denials. In 
addition to an answer the Leavitts cross complained against 
the Kartchners for $8,37 5.00 and the return of their $1,500.00 
money order. No notice to quit was ever served upon 
Eleanor Blohm in this or any other action. (Transcript 
page 35.) 
:::: r~ 
O:l 
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On or about May 27, 1957, the Hancocks, vendors, and 
the Kartchners and one Nephi Cutler, vendees, knowing 
full well of the contract rights of the plaintiffs and of the 
defendant and knowing full well the unsettled status of 
Civil No. 2148, all partie·s to such contract also being parties 
to said lawsuit with the exception of Nephi Cutler, entered 
into a Uniform Real Estate Contract for the sale of the 
property in dispute. (Exhibit No. 9.) This contract also 
asdgned all of the rights of the Hancocks in and to their 
causes of action set forth in said Civil No. 2148 to the 
vendees. This was an obvious attempt to vitiate the Leavitts 
equity. The sales price was $60,762.88 (the exact balance 
due under the Hancock-Smith contract); the down pay-
ment was $2,000.00 (slightly less than the delinquent pay-
ments); the monthly payments were $350.00 for 3 years 
and $300.00 per month thereafter. The grace period was 
only 25 days. 
On April 10, 1957, the Leavitts accepted a contract pay-
ing $50.00 per month from Blohm instead of her delinquent 
payments. The total credit allowed on the contract was 
$2,341.67. 
On August 9, 1957, the plaintiffs by and through their 
alter ego, Vineyard Investment Corporation purchased the 
equity of Kartchner and Cutler in and to the May 27 con-
tract. (Exhibit 10.) The June payment on this contract 
was timely made and the July payment was accepted by the 
Hancocks in the later part of September. At all times 
herein mentioned the Leavitts were officers and directors 
in Vineyard Investment Corporation and Mrs. Leavitt 
owned 98% of its stock. 
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On December 10, 1957, the Hancocks filed their com-
plaiilt in Civil No. 2207, seeking forfeiture, repossession and 
attorney's fees under the May 27, 1957, contract from the 
plaintiffs and the defendant in this action. This suit was 
based upon an October 24, 1957, demand for payment which 
demanded a June payment which the Hancccks were 
estopped from asserting, and demanded 1957 taxes before 
the same were due. Vineyard answered denying 
the default and counterclaimed for the sum of $22,-
500.00. On or about January 21, 1958, the defendant Eleanor 
Blohm abandoned the possession of the property to the 
Hancocks without notice to the Leavitts. On or about Jan-
uary 31, 1957, these two friendly litigants stipulated that a 
default judgment might be entered. This was done by the 
Court, without notice to the other parties to the action, the 
Leavitts, on February 17, 1958. 
Eleanor Blohm was in undisturbed and peaceable pos-
session of the premises from November 10, 1956, to January 
21, 1958. (Transcript page 110.) Mrs. Blohm did not make 
the entire May, 1957, payment nor did she make any pay-
ments thereafter although demand was made for the same. 
(Transcript page 126). 
On April 22, 1958, the Hancocks, vendors, and the 
Leavitts, vendee's, entered into a new Uniform Real Estate 
Contract for the sale of the property in dispute. (Exhibit 
No. 21.) The purchase price was $60,696.22, the balance due 
under the old Hancock-Smith contract, and the down pay-
ment was $23,242.00 (the amounts received by the Hancocks 
under the old Smith contract excluding interest). On July 
8, 1958, the Hancocks brought an action seeking to terminate 
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this agreement. The Leavitts were never served. It is the 
cont~ntion of the Leavitts that this lawsuit Civil No. 2236 
should be dismissed, the May payment under this contract 
haing been timely tendered. 
At this time it may be well to review the status of the 
myriad contracts month by month: 
November 30, 1956. Blohm was delinquent the No-
vember 10, payment due Verda Lynn in the amount 
of $450.00. The Hancocks were paid through Oc-
tober 15th and that contract was well within the 45 
day grace period. 
December 31, 1956. Blohm was delinquent two pay-
ments of $450.00, and her grace period had lapsed. 
The grace period in the Hancock-Smith contract 
was still in effect. Kartchner was paid to date. 
January 31, 1957: Blohm was behind $970.00 and her 
grace period had lapsed. The grace period under the 
Hancock-Smith contract had lapsed and it would 
have taken $600.00 to reinstate this contract. Kartch-
ner had been paid to date. Leavitt had no knowledge 
of any delinquencies. 
February 28, 1957. Blohm was l:ehind $1,420.00 and 
her contract had lapsed. It required $900.00 to bring 
the Hancock contract within the grace period. 
March 31, 1957: Leavitt paid Kartchner $1,500.00 on 
March 26, which paid his contract with Kartchner 
up through June 10, 1957. Hancock was tendered 
$1,500.00 which was sufficient to bring the Smith 
contract current through the March payment and 
extend the grace period to May 1st, 1958. 
April 30, 1957: Blohm had paid a total of $2,721.67 
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on her contract which paid the payments through 
April 10, 1957, with $21.67 of the May 10 payment 
having been made. 
May 31, 1957: Blohm had made a partial pay-
ment of $21.67 for May and was delinquent $428.33. 
The Hancock-Kartchner contract was in full force 
and effect. 
June 30, 1957: Blohm was delinquent $1,058.33 and 
her grace period had expired. The June payment 
on the Hancock-Kartchner contract was made. 
July 31, 1957: Blohm was delinquent $1,688.33. The 
Hancock-Kartchner contract was in full force and 
effect. 
August 31, 1957: Blohm was delinquent $2,318.33. 
The Hancock-Kartchner contract was in full force 
and effect. 
September 30, 1957: Blohm was delinquent $2,948.33. 
The Hancock-Kartchner contract (now assigned to 
Leavitt) was in full force and effect. 
October 31, 1957: Blohm was delinquent $3,578.33. 
The Kartchner-Hancock contract as assigned to 
Leavitt was delinquent $350.00. 
November 30, 1957: Blohm was delinquent $4,028.33 
and Leavitt was delinquent $1,050.00. 
December 31, 1957: Blohm was delinquent $4,478.33 
and Leavitt was delinquent $1,400.00. 
January 31, 1958: Blohm was delinquent $4,928.33. 
Leavitt was delinquent $1,750.00. 
February 28, 1958: Blohm was delinquent $5,378.33 
and Leavitt $2,100.00. 
March 31, 1958: Blohm $5,828.33, Leavitt $2,450.00 
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April 30, 1958: Blohm $6,278.33, the Leavitt-Han-
cock contract of April 22, 1958, is in full force and 
effect. 
May 31, 1958: Blohm is delinquent $6,628.33. 
November 30, 1958: The Leavitt-Hancock contract 
is in full force and effect having never been law-
fully terminated, and all payments due having been 
tendered prior to lawsuit. Blohm is delinquent $9,-
878.33. Interest on past due installments to Novem-
ber 10, 1958 is $458.35. -
It may be well to summarize the benefits received by 
each party involved in the property: 
The Hancocks received 
Verda Lynn received 
Jay Kartchner receive~ 
$ 23,242.00 
$ 8,705.00 
$ 13,000.00 
Eleanor Blohm received 14 months possession and 
took $4,500.00 out of the property. 
The Leavitts received $2,341.67 and paid out about 
$36,000.00. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN D E N Y I N G 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND/OR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED 
TO ALLOW THE PLAINTIFF TO AMEND ITS COM-
PLAINT AND/OR INTRODUCE EVIDENCE SHOW-
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ING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD REMOVED VAL-
UABLE PERSONAL PROPERTY FROM THE PREM-
ISES FOR WHICH THE PLAINTIFFS SHOULD RE-
COVER. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL C 0 U R T ERRED IN GRANTING 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT AND 
SHOULD HAVE ENTERED JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 
OF THE PLAINTIFFS UPON THE SECOND CAUSE 
OF ACTION. 
ARGUMENT POINT I 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DE-
NYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND/OR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEAD-
INGS. 
The facts in this case as set out in plaintiffs' State-
ment of Facts were all before the Court below when it 
ruled upon plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in 
the form of the Exhibits and Depositions of Eleanor Blohm, 
Verda Lynn and Jesse J. Leavitt. Upon these facts and 
the Exhibits the Court should have ruled in favor of the 
plaintiffs in the amount of the installments due under Ex-
hibit 6 (Uniform Real Estate Contract between Verda Lynn 
as Seller and Eleanor Blohm as Buyer as assigned to Jesse 
J. Leavitt and Phoebe Leavitt). 
The pleadings of the defendant in this case at the time 
of plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment upon the pleadings ad-
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mitted the execution of the contract between the defendant 
and third party defendant as assigned to the plaintiffs and 
in fact set forth the language of this contract in its en-
tirety. (Defendant's Third Party Complaint). This third 
party complaint against the third party defendant Lynn 
setting forth the claim of defendant for damages by virtue 
of the misrepresentations claimed to have been made nega-
tive any issue of damages from the plaintiffs for if the de-
fendant was damaged by the misrepresentations of Lynn she 
could not have been damaged by any action of the plain-
tiffs in this case. 
If the defendant has any damage for failure of title, 
and we do certainly not admit this to be the case, she would 
of necessity have to recover these damages from Lynn for 
if, as the Court below seems to feel, the contract was in de-
fault on November 10, 1956, (plaintiff of course contends 
that the Hancock-Smith contract, Exhibit 1, was not so 
in default) then defendants claim for damages in this wise 
must of necessity be recoverable, if at all, from the third 
party defendant since the plaintiffs had not even entered 
the picture at this time. Indeed their assignment (Exhibit 
6) was not executed until January 10, 1957, and then they 
did not assume any existing obligation of the third party 
defendant, Lynn, to the defendant, Blohm, but rather were 
assigned only whatever right, title and interest Lynn may 
have had in the property and in the contracts concerning 
the same. 
Applying the law to the pleadings, and certainly to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment it is difficult to understand 
how the Court could fail to grant one motion or the other, 
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for a defaulting vendee who knows that her vendor does 
not h~ve title but only has a conditional right to secure the 
same and must rely upon the contract payments of such 
defaulting vendee to perfect such rights cannot recover 
from the vendor but the vendor can recover full damages 
from the vendee. 55 American Jurisprudence, Section 555. 
Roper v. Milbourne, 142 NW 792, 52 A.L.R. 1530. 
Seeking v. King, 17 A2d 869, 134 A.L.R. 1060. These cases 
are broad enough of course to sustain the claim of the plain-
tiffs for specific performance of the contract to the extent 
of the payments past due under the contract. The defend-
ant in her answer admits that no payments were made be-
yond June, 1957. 
L1 order to recover damages when title fails the vendee 
must tender possession and at least be able to tender the 
payments. 55 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, Sections 
556, 605, 601, 602; McKeller v. Paxton, 218 P 128; Nelson v. 
Fernando, 55 P2d 859, 134 A.L.R. 1088; Hardin v. Union, 
271 NW 176; Fitcher v. Walling, 279 NW 417; Fleisheher 
v. Lockwood, 16 NYS 205; Miller v. Smith, 267 NW 176; 
Stryker v. Marschner, 264 NW 344; Continental v. Jones, 
142 SW 401; and Thayer v. McGill, 55 P2d 1272. In the 
instant case the defendant tendered neither possession nor 
the back payments, and the pleadings so admit. 
The; following language appears in McBride v. Stewart, 
68 Utah 12, 249 P 114, 48 ALR 267, in turn citing Foxley v. 
Rich, 35 Utah 162, 99 P. 666: 
"The Court in that ca3e held that the purchaser 
of land who was in default and had abandoned the 
premises, and who had refused to make the payments 
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stipulated after repeated requests, could not re-
cover the money paid. Clearly under the facts re-
cited in that case, no other conclusion ought to have 
been reached than that the plaintiff (vendee) there 
was not entitled to recover the money paid as part of 
the purchase price. He had refused to make the pay-
ments, had abandoned the property, and had still 
refused to pay when requested ... " 
The facts in the instant case are squarely in point with 
the Foxley case. 
In McKellar v. Paxton, 62 Utah 97, 218 P. 128, wherein 
the vendors seek to recover the full unpaid purchase price 
of the property from the vendees, the Court said: 
"In Harvey v. Morris, 63 Mo. 475, the Court 
Said : 'Where a purchaser of land, by virtue of the 
contract of purchase, is put in possession of the land 
purchased, he cannot resist the payment cf the pur-
chase money without offering to restore the posses-
sion thus acquired by him to the venor. He cannot 
be permitted to occupy, possess and enjoy the profits 
of the land bought and at the same time be allowed 
to withhold the price agreed to be paid.'" 
"That language is quoted by the Supreme Court 
of Kansas in Dunn v. Mills, 70 Kan. 656, 79 P 147; 3 
Ann Cas. 363. See also, McCourt v. Johns, 33 Or 561, 
53 P 601; Taft v. Kessel, 16 Wis 273; Wickman v. 
Robinson, 14 Wis 493, 80 Am Dec 789. 
"It is further insisted and argued as a defense 
against plaintiffs' claim that the testimony showed 
plaintiffs were unable to convey a merchantable title. 
The covenants on the part of plaintiffs and defend-
ants, as found in the written contract, are indepen-
dent and mutual. The plaintiffs bound themselves 
to 'convey or cause to be conveyed in fee simple ... 
by warranty deed, when payment by said purc_haser 
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of the consideration . . . shall have been full per-
formed.' The purchasers undertook to make the 
payments as stated in the agreement. By the plain 
provisions of the contract, the seller was not re-
quired nor obligated to convey the premises until 
the full purchase price had been paid. In the absence 
of some showing that plaintiffs did not have title 
to the premises, or could not acquire title, it may 
seriously be doubted whether the defect of title, 
if there was a defect, could be interposed as a de-
fense to plaintiffs' action to recover the purchase 
price." (Italics supplied by the writer). 
The facts in the instant case are squarely in point with this 
law on the subject. 
Section 601 of 55 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE is 
hereinbelow repeated in its entirety: 
"Performance or Offer by Purchaser to Per-
form: Effect of Default of Purchaser-In accordance 
with the general rule that a party to a contract 
who asks for rescission thereof must himself be 
without fault, there is considerable authority sup-
porting the broad view that purchaser in default 
is not entitled to rescind and recover back 
money paid upon the p u r c h a s e price. In 
this connection, it may be observed that, as here-
inbefore mentioned, where the promise to convey 
the title required by the contract is conditioned 
upon payment, the vendor is not obligated to convey 
and there can be no breach unless payment is made 
or tendered; in such a case the purchaser must pay 
or tender payment in order to put the vendor in de-
fault. Accordingly, where the vendor's promise 
is conditioned upon performance by the purchaser 
of whatever is to be performed upon his part, which 
is, of course, chiefly the payment of the purchase 
price, nonperformance by the vendor does not con-
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stitute a breach warranting rescission unless the 
purchaser performs or tenders performance. In 
other words, where the vendor's promise is so con-
ditioned, the purchaser must perform or tender per-
formance in order to put the vendor in default and 
entitle the purchaser to rescind the executory con-
tract and recover back money paid upon the purchase 
price. Thus, a vendee's nonperformance of a cove-
nant therein to make improvement has been held 
to accrue when the contract price is fully paid. A 
purchaser of land who does not offer to perform 
the contract on his part until several days after the 
time set for performance cannot enforce a forfeiture 
for nonperformance on the part of the vendor. How-
ever, even though the vendor's promise is condi-
tioned upon payment by the purchaser of the pur-
chase price, there may be an obligation to perform 
and a breach upon the part of the vendor without 
payment or tender of payment by the purchaser 
where payment or tender of payment would be use-
less, as where the vendor us unable or refuses to 
perform. Accordingly, where performance or tender 
of performance by the vendee would be useless, the 
vendee need not perform or tender performance in 
order to rescind for a breach of the vendor." (Italics 
supplied by writer.) 
The Court's attention is directed to 40 A. L. R. 693, 
where it is said: 
"See also Poheim v. Meyers (1908) 9 Cal. App. 
31, 98 Pac. 65, in which it is held that where the 
vendee in a contract in which time is of the essence 
is in default, he cannot, without tendering the bal-
ance due, recover a payment theretofore made on the 
contract, on the ground that the title of the vendor is 
defective. 
"The decisions on the subject appear to warrant 
the following generalizations: Where the vendor 
has until the time for performance to obtain title 
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to the property which he has contracted to convey, 
or to remedy defects in such title, the purchaser 
cannot, prior to the time of performance claim the 
right to rescind because of such defects, and so 
must make a tender in order to put the vendor in 
default. Papesh v. Wagnon (1916) 29 Idaho 93, 157 
Pac. 775; Laub v. De Vault (1908) 139 111. App. 398; 
Claude v. Richardson (1905) 127 Iowa, 623, 103 N. W. 
991; Greenby v. Cheevers (1812) 9 Johns, (N. Y.) 
126; Pioneer Gold Min. Co. v. Price (1915) 189 Mo. 
App. 30, 176 S. W. 474; Goldman v. Willis (1901) 
64 App. Div. 508, 72 N. Y. Supp. 282; Ward v. James 
(1917) 84 Or. 375, 164 Pac. 370, 372 ... 
"Where under the terms of the contract the 
obligation to pay precedes or accompanies the obli-
gation to make ti tie, the purchaser must, in order to 
put the seller in default, pay or offer to pay the pur-
chase money; and hence cannot rescind on the 
ground of a defect in the title without tendering 
performance on his part. Dennis v. Straseburger 
(1891) 89 Cal. 583, 26 Pac. 1070; Leach v. Rowley 
(1903) 138 Cal. 709, 72 Pac. 403; Eames v. Germania 
Turn Verein (1881) 8 Ill. App. 663; Claude v. Rich-
ardson (1905) 127 Iowa 623, 103 N. W. 991; Hartley 
v. James (1872) 50 N.Y. 38.'J 
Also op. ei te page 696: 
"Mere defect of title in the vendor, and a present 
inability to give such a title as he covenanted to 
give, do not in all cases dispense with the necessity 
of payment of the entire purchase money and the 
demand by the vendee of a conveyance, in order to 
entitle the latter to maintain an action to recover 
back the purchase money already paid; and where 
in such an action there is no proof of tender of pay-
ment of the purchase money and of demand for the 
conveyance, and it is shown that, notwithstanding 
an infirmity of title in the vendor, if the purchase 
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money had been paid the vendee could and would 
have obtained a title conforming to the covenant, 
the plaintiff cannot maintain the action. Pate v. 
McConnell (1894) 106 Ala. 449, 18 So. 98; Drake v. 
Nunn (1923) 210 Ala. 136, 97 So. 211. 
"In Dennis v. Strassburger (1891) 89 Cal. 583, 26 
Pac. 1070, an action to recover the amount of a de-
posit in part payment made under a contract reciting 
the sale of certain property for a stated sum and 
further providing: 'fifteen days allowed for exam-
ination of title and completion of purchase; i. e. 
$7,200 is to be paid upon the tender of good and suf-
ficient deed conveying a title; if title is defective 
thirty days are allowed to perfect the same, and, if 
after the expiration of said term, unless extended 
by mutual consent, the title shall not have been per-
fected, the deposit is to be returned on demand. If 
the sale is not consummated according to the fore-
going conditions, the deposit is to be forfeited and 
become the property of the undersigned. Time is 
the essence of this contract'-it was. held that, in 
order to recover, the plaintiff should have tendered 
the balance of the purchase price and demanded his 
deed, and, if such demand was refused, he should 
then have demanded the return of his money; that 
if he based his right of recovery upon defective title 
he should have notified defendant that the title was 
defective; and, if upon the expiration of thirty days 
from that time defendant had not perfected his 
title, then he should have demanded a return of the 
amount paid, and a refusal would have formed a 
basis for a good cause of action." 
Also 40 A. L. R. 700: 
"But in Joyce v. Shafer (1893) 97 Cal. 335, 32 
Pac. 320, where it appeared that some time after 
the last payment fell due, the vendor, without ten-
dering a deed to the purchaser or demanding pay-
ment from her, without her consent sold and con-
veyed the land to another, it was held that the pur-
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chaser could not sue to recover the money paid, with-
out having tendered the amount due on the contract, 
since, nothwithstanding the conveyance to the third 
person, the vendor might be able, when the time of 
performance should arrive, to furnish a good title. 
"Where the conveyance to a third person is 
shown to have been made subject to the contract, the 
purchaser cannot sue to recover his deposit with-
out first tendering performance. Nance v. Avenall 
(1915) 20 Cal. App. 551, 147 Pac. 583." 
The significant fact in connection with the law stated 
as applied to the facts in the instant case is that whatever 
damage the defendant Blohm suffered she suffered because 
of her own failure to make payments for if the payments 
had been made she would have ultimately received her 
title. For these reasons the Court below should have 
granted plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings 
and/or motion for summary judgment and awarded the 
plaintiffs damages in the amount of the delinquent pay-
ments under the contract. 
ARGUMENT POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED 
TO ALLOW THE PLAINTIFF TO AMEND ITS COM-
PLAINT AND/OR INTRODUCE EVIDENCE SHOW-
ING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD REMOVED VAL-
UABLE PERSONAL PROPERTY FROM THE PREM-
ISES FOR WHICH THE PLAINTIFFS SHOULD RE-
COVER. 
Wherever a claim is asserted by one the other always 
has the right to minimize the damages claimed by showing 
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either that the damages were not that great or by showing 
any off-sets he may have etc. In the instant case the pretrial 
order was certainly broad enough to allow the plaintiffs 
to introduce such evidence but the Court summarily de-
nied this request. 
Rule 15 (a) of the U. R. C. P., UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED, 1953, provides" ... Otherwise a party may 
amend his pleadings only by leave of court or by written 
consent of the adverse part; and leave shall be fr,eely given 
when justic,e so requires ... " (!tallies supplied by the 
writer). Certainly the discretion of the Court below was 
abused in this instance for the defendant admitted that 
it could not claim surprise and the plaintiffs asserted that 
they had discovered these facts only since the pre-trial. 
(Transcript pages 3, and 4.) Certainly an injustice is done 
if the defendant is allowed to have the value of this per-
sonal property and also a j1..1dgment against the plaintiffs 
without offset. 
ARGUMENT POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT AND 
SHOULD HAVE ENTERED JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 
OF THE PLAINTIFFS UPON THE SECOND CAUSE 
OF ACTION. 
The Court at this point is requested to examine all 
of the law and all of the cases cited to it by the plaintiffs 
in their argument of Point I. It is our position that this law 
is concise and clear and that the facts in the instant case 
clearly square with the facts in the cases cited. For this 
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reason it is only urged in the alternative that if then the 
defendant is entitled to damages, the true measure thereof 
is the difference in the value of the property less the bal-
ance due under the contract. 55 AMERICAN JURISPRU-
DENCE, Section 510, 556; Pembroke v. Caudill, 37 S2d 538. 
So of course the trial Court erred in excluding Exhibit 28, 
showing the value of the Phoenix property to be at best 
$25,000.00, and in ignoring the stipulated value of the Heber 
City property at $47,500.00. Transcript page 100. Mr. 
Hatch also stipulated that the appraisers who authored 
Exhibit 28 were qualified experts and that if they were 
called they would testify to the effect set out in said Ex-
hibit. Unfortunately because of the questionable censor-
ship of the court reporter this is not included in the tran-
script and further because the Court would not give the 
plaintiffs extra time to secure this additional part of the 
proceedings from the court reporter who was "too busy" to 
start working on the same before the end of February. How-
ever, Mr. Hatch, I am sure, will not at this late date deny 
this stipulation. 
When this value is compared with the contract balance 
due of about $87,000.00 it is apparent that the defendant 
has no damages under this theory of the law but in fact 
the damages are minus $40,000.00. "The Courts cannot 
supervise decisions made in the business world and grant 
relief when the bargain proves improvident." Col~ v. 
Parker, 5 Utah 2d 275, 300 P2d 623. 
Neither has the defendant any damages for her down 
payment since its value was only $25,000.00 and she owed 
$31,000.00 or this property. (Transcript page 109.) The 
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parties, set no value on this property, they merely traded 
equities. (Transscript page 99}. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment against the plaintiffs should be set aside 
and the cause remanded for further proceedings or in the 
alternative the Trial Court should be ordered to enter judg-
ment on the pleadings or otherwise in the amount of the 
delinquent payments due from the defendant to the plain-
tiffs under the contract set forth in Exhibit 6. 
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